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. Introduction
“Syria has become the great tragedy of this
century”, says former UN High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR), António Guterres: “a
disgraceful humanitarian calamity with suffer-
ing and displacement unparalleled in recent
history.”1 Since the outbreak of the conflict in
Syria, it is estimated that around 12 million
people have fled their homes. A bleak scenario
seems to be playing out against the backdrop
of a Europe crumbling under the sheer weight
of mounting waves of refugees. Dramatic pho-
tos of refugees en route circulate in the media
and fuel fears in Europe, aptly manipulated by
political parties, that EU member states will be
soon overrun by this blur of humanity. All this
has produced political heat across Europe.
Many political leaders and a compliant media
cry out for the need to stop the Syrian exodus.
However, all these accounts seem to overlook
the fact that fewer than 700,000 Syrians de-
clared asylum in the European Union from the
beginning of the crisis to October 2015.2 On
the other hand, according to the UNHCR, over
7.5 million are internally displaced (IDPs) and
almost 4.5 million have fled seeking refuge in
Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and Jordan.3 Nonethe-
less, the full glare of the media spotlight seems
to remain focused on the European case. The
supposedly epic proportion of the Syrian flow
to Europe distracts from the growing number
of those refugees who have little if no intention
of going to Europe. 
Although the number of refugees coming to
Europe has risen dramatically over the last
year, the depiction of Syrian refugees as a
mass of people waiting to seize the best op-
portunity to leave their country and go to Eu-
rope is problematic. Not only must we seri-
ously entertain the possibility that many
Syrian refugees in Europe may perceive their
stay only as a temporary strategy pending
their return to Syria. A considerable number
of refugees living in Syria’s immediate neigh-
bours – Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan –
actually returned to their war-ravaged country
rather than facing an unknown future in any
of the EU member states. In Jordan, for ex-
ample, the number of new arrivals now seems
to be lower than of those voluntarily returning
to Syria. Most importantly, the majority of
refugees in the country are today considering
a prompt return to their homeland as an op-
tion if the protraction of the Syrian crisis fur-
ther limits their income earning and employ-
ment opportunities.4 By focusing on Syrian
refugees living in Jordan,5 this article will look
at the consequences of the protracted dis-
placement of refugees in Jordan. What will be
argued here is that the refugees’ decision to
travel cannot be reduced to a mere self-inter-
est or cost–benefit analysis. Seeking refuge
has to be understood as the outcome of a
complex process of decision making moti-
vated by a range of factors, not least the
refugees’ affective relationship with their
country. 
ﬃ UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response, 2015.
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I. Syrian Refugees in Jordan
At the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the large
influx of refugees to Jordan was generally ac-
companied by demonstrations of solidarity,
hospitality and tolerance from the host soci-
ety towards the newcomers. Family ties as
well as linguistic and cultural relations be-
tween Syrian refugees and the members of
Jordanian host communities have facilitated
the reception of Syrians in the Kingdom of
Jordan. However, the protracted nature of the
crisis is now affecting the relationship be-
tween the two communities. As of November
2015, over 633,000 Syrians have regis tered
with the UNHCR in Jordan.6 The massive
numbers of refugees over almost five years
has had a serious impact on the already mea-
gre Jordanian national resources. All this has
meant that Jordanians, who at first welcomed
refugees, have become hostile: those who
were originally ḍuyūf (guests) are now lāji’īn
(refugees). The belief that refugees are thriv-
ing on scarce local resources is common
amongst increasingly resentful host commu-
nities. There is also the widespread belief
among less advantaged Jordanians that Syr-
ian refugees thrive thanks to a lavishly gener-
ous international community that is fulfilling
the needs of the latter while leaving the for-
mer stranded and without resources. 
According to the Jordanian Economic and So-
cial Council, the Syrian crisis has cost the
country USD 1.2 billion, and the financial bur-
den is expected to rise to USD 4.2 billion by
2016.7 Jordan’s international trade has been
gravely affected by the loss of one of the prin-
cipal points of access to regional trade
through Syria. A recent study reveals that the
Syrian crisis has had a particularly negative
impact on Jordanian structural vulnerabilities.
The available services within the hosting com-
munities have grown thinner, raising serious
concerns over the availability of already lim-
ited resources: the chronic lack of safe drink-
able water, for instance. The influx of refugees
has also increased the demand on schools,
sanitation, housing, food and energy to an in-
tolerable extent. In particular, the arrival of
Syrian refugees seems to have had a nega-
tive impact on Jordan’s housing sector. Rent
prices have tripled or even quadrupled in bor-
der zones and other areas of high refugee
density. As the majority of Syrians do not live
in camps, this rise can be explained by the
sharp increase in demand for housing and by
the refugees’ capacity to afford higher prices
by sharing housing with others to bring down
costs.8
The protracted nature of the crisis is now ag-
gravating the relationship between the two
communities. It should be noted, however,
that Syrian refugees are blamed for a variety
of issues that have always plagued Jordan’s
dysfunctional infrastructure and stagnant eco-
nomic market. The job market constitutes an-
other point of friction. Work permits are not
being issued to Syrians, principally due to pro-
hibitive costs and adminis trative obstacles.
Non-Jordanians with legal residency and a
valid passport can obtain a work permit only if
the prospective employer pays a fee and
shows that the job requires experience or
skills not to be found among the Jordanian
population. Nonetheless, a recent UNHCR
survey reports that only 1% of visited refugee
households had a member with a work permit
in Jordan.9 Despite the official restrictions on
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orking, many refugees work informally. Jor-
danians often perceive Syrians as competi-
tors for jobs, yet a recent report published by
the International Labour Organisation (ILO)
shows not only that unemployment rates are
not correlated with the areas with large in-
fluxes of Syrian refugees, but also that Syrian
refugees are mainly working in jobs in the in-
formal sector that are commonly performed by
non-Jordanian migrant workers, such as
Egyptians – e.g. in agriculture, construction,
food service and retail.10
III. A Protracted Emergency
As a result of this prolonged crisis, the situa-
tion has radically worsened for Syrian
refugees in Jordan. 
The Government of Jordan is not a signatory
of the 1951 Geneva Convention, which re-
lates to the status of refugees, or its 1967 Pro-
tocol. The country deals with refugees within
certain margins of discretion. The large ma-
jority of refugees interviewed lamented the
systematic restriction of their movement fol-
lowing the recent approval of a number of reg-
ulations by the host country. Ever since the
second half of 2014, the Jordanian authorities
have progressively restrained Syrian
refugees’ freedom of movement in urban
areas. Refugees used to be able to register
with the UNHCR no matter the status of their
documentation. Since 14 July 2014, the gov-
ernment has instructed the UNHCR to stop is-
suing Asylum Seeker Certificates (ASCs) to
Syrian refugees that have left the camps with-
out proper “bail out” documentation. The ASC
is indispensable for obtaining the Ministry of
Interior (MoI) Service Card, which grants
refugees access to public healthcare and ed-
ucation services in host communities. The
new policy has consequently affected many
Syrian households. Furthermore, the cards
need to be renewed on a yearly basis. The
cost of renewing a MOI card is JOD 50 for
each member, which makes it extremely ex-
pensive for large households. Refugees with-
out a valid MoI card have to pay a fine; ac-
cording to interviewees, the authorities deport
those refugees who have not paid the fine
within three months to either Syria or the
refugee camps.
The majority of my interviewees also
lamented the great challenges that they have
to face to access basic services. For exam-
ple, public hospitals – subsidised by the UN –
were open to Syrian refugees for over three
years after the outbreak of the Syrian conflict.
However, free healthcare provided to Syrians
overburdened the country’s capacity to main-
tain the service. Since July 2014, primary
health care services are available to all regis-
tered Syrians at subsidised prices only upon
the presentation of a health certificate. The
certificate, however, is costly and covers only
a limited range of health issues. As Mo-
hammed – a refugee in his mid-thirties – ex-
plained, “if my daughter would need to go
through surgical operation as happened three
years ago [she has a heart issue], we would
not be able to do anything for her as now we
have to pay for this type of intervention. This
is why I want to go to Europe; I simply cannot
afford to stay in Jordan any longer”. Further-
more, restrictions on freedom of movement
have further infringed upon these services. In
Jordan, valid residence permits are indispen-
sable for obtaining access to public health-
care services in host communities. A recent
NRC study in Jordan reports how the lack of
proper health coverage is one of the greatest
challenges faced by refugees with limited
legal status.11
Overall, vulnerability is increasing, and
refugees have often to resort to negative
coping mechanisms to survive. Refugee
families have coped with the status quo by
liquidating the few assets that they were
able to bring along with them, relying on hu-
10 ILO, The Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on the Labour Market in Jordan, 2015, 14.
11 NRC, In search of a home, 2015.
3anitarian assistance and working, mostly
illegally. However, these work and humani-
tarian “opportunities” decreased steadily in
2014 and almost disappeared towards the
end of 2014. An ILO study reports, for ex-
ample, that close to half of the Syrian
refugees’ families have one working child.12
A previous UNWOMEN assessment reveals
that 47% of paid employment in refugee
households came from children.13 Syrian
families have also been readier to turn to
early marriage, common in some parts of the
Syrian community prior the war in order to
ensure a better economic position and a
safer space for their daughters.14 Further-
more, the requirement to pledge not to work
and the limitations on obtaining working per-
mits render Syrians dependent on humani-
tarian assistance or debt. Syrians have
heavily relied on humanitarian aid from the
UNHCR and other NGOs. However, funding
shortfalls have negatively affected humani-
tarian aid inflow for the past two years. In
Jordan, as of September 2015, over half of
urban refugees who had been receiving
some food aid from the World Food Pro-
gramme (WFP) lost their benefits.15 The re-
maining half received only JOD 10 (USD 14)
instead of the planned JOD 20 (USD 28)
due to the ongoing funding crisis. Inter-
viewed refugees in Jordan identified the im-
minent suspension of WFP assistance in
urban areas as the deadline for their stay in
the country. 
IV. The Choice of Leaving
Against the backdrop of their deteriorating
situation in Jordan, large numbers of Syrian
refugees have expressed a desire to leave
this host country. Many of them describe mi-
gration as a way of escaping their hardships
in Jordan. However, even when the leaving
is not in doubt, the destination is. While many
wish to embark on journey to Europe, others
consider the return to Syria their only option. 
Socio-economic disparities amongst Syrian
refugees certainly played a role in the deci-
sion to leave.16 This may sound surprising. In
popular and journalistic accounts all over the
world, Syrian refugees are generally repre-
sented as a sea of humanity, an undistin-
guishable mass of individuals related to each
other by a common condition of extreme
destitution and poverty. Yet, while a shared
sense of misery is an important aspect of the
ways in which refugees imagine their condi-
tion in Jordan, this should not conceal the im-
portant forms of differentiation that are also
part of the Syrian community. A closer
scrutiny, indeed, reveals the existence of a
geographical and socio-economic fragmen-
tation within the composition of the refugee
population. If this fragmentation has largely
influenced Syrians’ patterns of accommoda-
tion in Jordan,17 it is partly affecting the pre-
ferred destination today of refugees that
want to leave the country. 
12 ILO, Rapid Assessment on Child Labor in the Urban Informal Sector in Three Governorates of Jordan, 
2015. Also, note that many studies have shown how child labour amongst Syrian refugees is a widespread
phenomenon, which is not perceived by local communities as being inherently negative. See, for example,
Un Ponte Per, Comprehensive Assessment on Syrian Refugees Residing in the Community in Northern
Jordan, 2012.
13 UNWOMEN, Gender-based Violence and Child Protection among Syrian refugees in Jordan, with a focus
on Early Marriage, 2015, 3.
14 Note that Syrian refugees have also developed some positive coping strategies. One example is the
relevance of community support as one of the main sources of income for many households. Care, Syrian
Refugees in urban Jordan report, 2012.
15 The World Food Programme (WFP) has recently reinstated food assistance until January 2016 to those 
refugees who have been without since September 2015. See Jordan Times, WFP to reinstate food aid to
229,000 Syrian, 2015.
16 For a comparative study of current displacement trends to the EU amongst Syrian refugees living in the
Middle East, see REACH, Migration trends & patterns of Syrian asylum seekers travelling to the European
Union, 2015.
17 See UNHCR, Syrian Refugees Living Outside Camps in Jordan, 2013.
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efugees living in Amman were generally
keen to embark on an irregular journey to Eu-
rope. These were mostly medium-high skilled
workers from Syrian urban areas. They be-
lieved they had the sufficient cultural capital
for that: a westernised style of life and some
fluency in English. Many of their relatives and
friends were already living in Europe – gener-
ally in Sweden and Germany. Mahmood and
his wife represent the category well. They are
from a well-off neighbourhood of Damascus,
are in their thirties and have two children.
Mahmood was an engineer in Syria; his wife,
Suhad, owned and worked in a pharmacist
near their house. They left Syria in 2013 after
a mortar shell hit and destroyed both their
house and pharmacy. They headed towards
Jordan. Jordanian authorities intercepted
Mahmood and his family at the border, and
took them to the Za’atari Camp. They spent
only three hours there, for registration, and left
soon after to Amman, where Suhad’s brother
had moved a year earlier. “It is impossible to
find a decent job in Jordan”, Mahmood
claimed, and continued: “the Jordanian gov-
ernment asked me to provide proper docu-
mentation as an engineer but these are not
available since in Syria these papers got lost
during the war. [\] We filed a request for re-
settlement with the UNHCR when we moved
to Jordan – our daughter is very sick – but we
never heard back from them. I cannot wait
anymore. Next week I will leave for Europe
and I will ask for family reunification. My wife
would like me to go to Sweden where her
brother just moved. But I think I will go to Ger-
many; my friends told me that life there is very
good”.
Syrian refugees coming from rural areas gen-
erally showed a quite different attitude. Many
were farmers and farm-workers from around
Daraa with no or very little knowledge of Eng-
lish; the majority of them lived in Za’a’tari
Camp or in Irbid and the villages nearby.18 The
refugees’ decision to leave for Europe cannot
be understood without an appropriate recog-
nition of the complex demands of earning a
living in a precarious economic context. Yet
socio-economic status affects the decision to
leave in a complex manner. It was not only a
lack of means that set Syrians on a journey to
Europe; these refugees may have been
poorer than their counterparts in Amman, but
they had still something left in Syria – their
lands, on which they could have survived if
they had returned. Furthermore, many
refugees interviewed often argued that they
did not want to go to Europe because they
would never be able to integrate into a culture
so different from theirs. As a Syrian man in his
late sixties put it: “I felt lost when I first fled
Syria to come to Jordan. I don’t want to feel
lost twice”. He was living in a small village
near the border with Syria. The man argued
that there was no future in Jordan. He con-
sidered returning to Syria, where life was
cheaper and where he owned a house. He
excluded categorically the possibility of mov-
ing to Europe: he was too old and too different
– he claimed – to get used to Europe. Fur-
thermore, he did not want his daughters to live
what he referred to as the immoral lifestyle of
European countries. Like him, many other
refugees faced forms of intense emotional
distress generated not by a forced immobility
but, on the contrary, by the very capacity to
move.
The desire to move raises considerable con-
cerns centred on the notions of community,
family and parenting – leaving is rarely, if ever,
an easy decision. A closer scrutiny of the
refugees’ trajectories sheds light on their am-
biguous relationship with the affective and po-
litical space of their homeland. While the
refugees certainly desired to leave their host
countries, they were not simply free-roaming
individuals seeking to escape as soon as pos-
sible in order to pursue better economic con-
ditions in Europe. The case of Umm Omar is
poignant. This woman came to Amman, Jor-
18 Ibid.
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dan, with her youngest son after the militias
of Syria’s dictator Bashar al-Assad suppos-
edly killed her three older sons. Umm Omar
called them shuhadā’ (martyrs): “they are
martyrs of the revolution”, the woman
claimed: “they fought against Bashar and died
for ḥurriya (freedom)”. She said this while flip-
ping through the pictures on her mobile: some
showing her children carrying machine guns,
others portraying them laid out in their coffins
just before burial. She told us how she had no
doubt about returning to Syria: “I am not leav-
ing [for Europe]. Where do you want me to
go?! I am too old to leave. But even if I were
younger, I would never do that: I would never
leave my country. I am ashamed of all these
shabāb (young men) who leave for Europe.
They should stay in Syria and fight for free-
dom, as my children did”. Her short comment
enclosed a complex set of assumptions
where gender, age and political allegiance are
intertwined and ultimately affect the choice of
destination.
V. Conclusion
The Syrian refugees’ personal accounts and
life stories shed light on the variety of ways in
which refugees negotiate the demands of mo-
bility at a time of great socio-economic and po-
litical uncertainty. Over the past two years, Jor-
dan has adopted harsher polices towards
refugees by periodically closing its borders and
limiting access to employment opportunities as
well as to health and educational facilities. In
the meantime, international donors are running
out of funds and humanitarian agencies – such
as the WFP, for instance – have dramatically
decreased their assistance to Syrians, push-
ing them to find better living conditions else-
where. Against this backdrop, many refugees
perceived departure to be the only solution to
their predicament. The choice of the destina-
tion was made according to various criteria.
Not all of them wanted to go to Europe; many
showed a determination to return to Syria – de-
spite the evident risks that a journey to their
war-ravaged country would entail. My intervie-
wees concurred that the journey to Europe
was expensive and dangerous, and that the
majority feared cultural estrangement once
there, be their final destination Sweden, Ger-
many or any other European country. They
saw these problems in the media, heard about
them from those who made it to Europe and
extrapolated from those who vanished on the
journey. However, while danger, costs and cul-
tural estrangement held some back, they did
not prevent many others from leaving or wish-
ing to leave. What ultimately determined the
decision whether to return to Syria or embark
on a long journey to Europe were a number of
interrelated factors generally linked to the
socio-economic status, age and social network
of the refugee-migrant. However, other factors
also emerged into the picture, such as
ideology, expectations and political considera-
tions, amongst others. Patterns of refugee mo-
bility challenge the notion that the choice of
destination is made on the basis of a mere
self-interest or cost–benefit analysis. By con-
trast, they show how the Syrian refugees’ tra-
jectories depend on complex frameworks of
self and subjectivity. 
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